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[Vol. XXI

DIVORCE: JURISDICTION OVER SERVICEMEN
The turbulent state of today's world affairs has demanded that a greater
number of Americans wear the military uniform than at any time since the
extraordinary circumstances of the Korean War. Government statistics
indicate that 3,376,511 military personnel were serving on active duty during
1967.1 While slightly less than the 3,635,912 figure of the Korean War period, 2
the 1967 figure is significantly higher than the 1960 level of 2,476,435, the year
preceding the intensification of the United States involvement in Vietnam. 3
Commensurate with this influx of men into the military establishment
has been a corresponding rise in the number of servicemen faced with the
frustrations of an unhappy marriage. Discordant martial unions have precipitated a significant rate of divorce for servicemen.4 A survey conducted
by the Department of the Army indicated domestic relations, specifically
divorce, to be the chief personnel problem among soldiers. Divorce often
5
manifested itself as the direct cause of numerous courts-martial.
In the United States some 479,000 divorces were granted in 1965.6 America
has averaged twice as many divorces per 100,000 population as Denmark,
Sweden, England, France, and Australia; four times as many as Norway and
Holland; and five times as many as Belgium. 7 Although the acquisition of a
divorce decree appears none too difficult for Americans in general, a serviceman may find himself effectively precluded from this remedy for marital
discord.
The United States Supreme Court has declared that the minimal jurisdictional prerequisite in an action for divorce is domicile of the plantiff in
the forum state. 8 A serviceman who desires to obtain a divorce may be
denied access to the courts of the state in which he is stationed on the
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, No. 372
(89th ed. 1968).
2. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL
TIMES TO 1957, at 736 (1960).
3. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1.
4. Letter from Frank A. Bartino, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Defense,
to William A. Evans, Feb. 24, 1969, in which Mr. Bartino stated that divorce rate statistics
for servicemen are not maintained by the Department of Defense. Based on the latest
available figures, it is estimated, however, that approximately 14,000 servicemen were
divorced in 1965. During 1965 the divorce rate for married women was 10.6/1000, U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1, at 61. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1965, table 16 (1967) indicates that there were 1,318,414 married servicemen
in 1965. Therefore, 10.6 x 1,318,414 = 13,975 servicemen divorces during 1965.
5. Smith, A Cursory Look at Family Problems in the Army, 3 J. FAMILY L. 157, 158
(1963).
6. U. S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 79
(89th ed. 1968).
7. Baum, A Trial Judge's Random Reflections on Divorce: The Social Problem and
What Lawyers Can Do About It, 6 J. FAMILY L. 61 (1966).
8. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). See also A. GOODRICH & E. SCOLS,
CONFLICT OF LAWS §127 (4th ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws
§15 (1934).
But cf. Bryce, Marriage and Divorce Under Roman and English Law, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY

782 (1909).
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grounds that he is not a domiciliary of that state. Full faith and credit recognition from sister states hinges on satisfaction of the domicile requirement. 9
Thus, even though a serviceman obtains a divorce without domicile, the
likelihood that it will be given effect if collaterally attacked by his spouse
or another interested party is somewhat less than a decree alleging domicile
as its jurisdictional basis. 10 This note seeks to explore the problems inherent
in the serviceman's dilemma of divorce without domicile and to suggest a
functional jurisdictional prerequisite for servicemen.
DoMIcILE

AS A JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITE

When neither the serviceman nor his spouse is domiciled in the forum
state, personal appearance by one of them is insufficient to grant jurisdiction. 1
An attempt by a serviceman to obtain a valid ex parte divorce decree in the
state in which he is stationed may be futile unless he meets the domicile
requirement or his wife makes an appearance. 2 Although a divorce rendered
ex parte may be challenged on the grounds that domicile was lacking in the
original proceeding, a decree rendered in any state after general appearance
by both parties cannot be attacked by a party litigant or a third party unless
the divorcing state permits such attack.1 3 The distinction is grounded on
the principle of res judicata applied to in personam actions and as made
relevant by the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. 4
When both husband and wife have made general appearances, each party
has had an opportunity to litigate the domicile question. The divorcing
state may therefore treat jurisdiction as having been established, and each
9. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1, which states: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each
state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the
Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved and the effect thereof." By Act of May 26, 1790, 28 U.S.C. 687
(1964), judgments "shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within
the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state ...
from which
they are taken." See also Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 238 (1945); Griswold,
Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A Comparative Study, 65 HARv.
L. REV. 193, 212 (1951).
10. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 162 Pa. Super. 22, 24, 56 A.2d 362, 364 (1948);
Lewis, Domicile of Military Personnel, 5 U.S.A.F. JAG BULL. 6-3, 4 (1963).
11. E.g., Winston v. Winston, 279 Ala. 534, 188 So. 2d 264 (1966); Poulin v. Poulin,
Me. -,
241 A.2d 611 (1968); Martin v. Martin, 253 N.C. 704, 118 S.E.2d 29 (1966);
Parker v. Parker, R.I. -,
238 A.2d 57 (1968); Thomas v. Thomas, 58 Wash. 2d 377,
363 P.2d 107 (1961).
12. E.g., Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 350 (1948); A. GOODRICH & E. Scoras, supra
note 8. An appearance by the attorney of the absent wife is sufficient, e.g., Johnson v.
Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951); In re Raynor's Estate, 165 Cal. App. 2d 715, 332 P.2d 416
(1958); In re Day's Estate, 7 Ill. 2d 348, 131 N.E.2d 50 (1955). But cf. Staedler v. Staedler,
6 N.J. 380, 78 A.2d 896 (1951); Donnell v. Howell, 257 N.C. 175, 125 S.E.2d 448 (1962).
13. See Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343
(1948); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). See also A. GooDRicH & E. ScoLES,
supra note 8, at §130.
14. See Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378, 384 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 352 (1948);
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945).
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sister state is bound to respect this treatment. 15 Third parties do not have
the kind of interest in the marriage relationship that permits them to attack
the jurisdictional basis of the divorce decree. 16 Thus, the doctrine of res
judicata and the Federal Constitution preserve decrees rendered if both
parties participate in the proceedings.
The serviceman's difficulty arises not in an in personam action in
which his wife appears but rather in an ex parte proceeding where he
must surmount the domicile hurdle alone. While domicile may preclude
the serviceman's access to the courts of the state in which he is stationed,
it is well settled that even though he is awarded a decree, a recital of facts
existent to support forum domicile will not be conclusive. A finding of
domicile is subject to collateral attack, often brought elsewhere by the
serviceman's spouse. 17 When it is subsequently determined that the court
of the rendering state lacked jurisdiction, the courts of other states are not
required by virtue of the full faith and credit clause to enforce the judgment.18 Such nonenforcement is said to be "part of the price of our federal
system."1 9
The rationale that underlies the domicile requirement was stated in the
0
first of the two Williams v. North Carolina decisions:2
Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the
marital status of persons domiciled within its borders. The marriage
relation creates problems of large social importance. Protection of
offspring, property interests, and the enforcement of marital responsibilities are . . . problems . . . with which the state must deal.

The differences of married people are appropriately remedied in accordance
with the laws of the community to which they belong. 21 Unhappy marital
unions present a serious problem and deserve the attention of the state as
a "third party" to the divorce proceeding itself. 22 Although the psychological

and economic problems of the litigants following divorce are significant,
perhaps the greatest interest of the state in the proceeding arises out of concern for the children of the broken homes. It is the avoidance of the prplexing societal problems with respect to these children that is asserted to
3
make domicile the sine qua non of divorce jurisdiction.2
15. Note, Statutory Presumptions of Domicile in Divorce: Full Faith and Credit and
Due Process, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1820, 1821 (1967).
16. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
17. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Lewis, supra note 10.
18. Grover & Baker Sewing Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890).
19. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942).
20. Id. at 298.
21. Wilson v. Wilson, [1872] L.R. 2 P. 8 D. 435, 442; Griswold, supra note 9, at 229.
22. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942).
23. Children of divorced parents must undergo the traumatic experience of readjusting
and redefining interfamily relationships exacted at the time of divorce while submitting
to use as coersive weapons by either or both spouses during the predivorce and postdivorce
stages: Baum, A Trial Judge's Random Reflections on Divorce: The Societal Problem and
What Lawyers Can Do About It, 6 J. FAMILY L. 61, 65 (1965); Landis, Dating Maturation
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The Supreme Court of Williams I and Williams II announced that domicile was, indeed, the law of the land. 24 The framers of the Constitution were
familiar with the requirement and as late as 1945 neither a United States
court nor any other English-speaking court had questioned it.25 Factually,
the Williams had lived with their prior respective spouses in North Carolina
where each was domiciled. They individually proceeded to Nevada and
after remaining there six weeks, filed suit for divorce and were awarded
ex parte decrees. They married each other there and subsquently returned
to North Carolina where they lived as husband and wife. North Carolina
prosecuted them for bigamous cohabitation. In spite of the defendants'
pleading the validity of their respective Nevada decrees, North Carolina
convicted them of the crimes charged.26 On appeal, Williams I held that full
faith and credit recognition of an ex parte divorce decree was required if
the defendants were domiciled in the Nevada forum. However, after retrial,
Williams II affirmed the conviction on the theory that if North Carolina
arrives at a finding contrary to that of another state as to whether a bona fide
domicile had been acquired by the defendants, it may refuse to give full faith
27
and credit to the defendants' foreign decrees.
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority in Williams II, announced
that "judicial power to grant a divorce - jurisdiction strictly speaking - is
founded upon domicile."28 The Court offered a succinct analysis of the
concept: "Domicile implies a nexus between person and place of such
permanence as to control the creation of legal relations and responsibilities
of the utmost significance." 29 Earlier, the Supreme Court determined that
residence in fact, coupled with an intent to make the residence one's permanent home are the two essential elements of domicile3o This language
has been interpreted generally to require a "present" intention to reside for
an indefinite period of times' with no intention of returning to a former
residence or moving elsewhere.3 2 Domicile is acquired at birth by everyone
of Children From Happy and Unhappy Marriages, J.

MARRIAGE & FAmIY LIVING 351, 353
(1963); Perry & Pfahl, Adjustment of Children in "Sole" and "Remarried" Homes, 25 J.

& FAmY LIMG 221, 223 (1963). Furthermore, divorce increases the vulnerability of children to emotional upset, neurosis, psychosis, and delinquency. Baum, supra
at 66. Most teenage suicides, for example, come from broken homes. Id. at 63. One authority contends the family relationship to be so crucial that strengthening and preserving
it would probably do more to prevent juvenile delinquency than any other single program,
MAmuGE

Monahan, Family Status and the Delinquent Child: A Reappraisal and Some New Findings,

35 SocILt FORcES 250, 258 (1958).
24. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U.S. 287 (1942).
25. 325 U.S. at 229. But see text accompanying note 12 supra.
26. See cases cited at note 24 supra.

27. Id.
28. 325 U.S. at 229; see Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S.

175 (1901).
29. 325 U.S. at 229-30.
30. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398,424 (1939).
31. RsrATEMENT oF CoNFLITr OF LAWS §20 (1934).
32. E.g., In re Glassford's Estate, 114 Cal. App. 2d 181, 249 P.2d 908 (1952); Zimmerman
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but may be changed by personal election. 33 The serviceman, no different
from his civilian counterpart, is born with a domicile of origin that remains
his legal residence unless he exercises his freedom to elect a new one.
An individual soldier, sailor, or airman might personally assuage the
problem of obtaining an unimpeachable divorce by properly choosing the
state in which he is stationed as his new domicile and thus removing the
jurisdictional infirmity. 34 The first of the two elements of domicile, residence,
presents little difficulty; military authorities have ordered the serviceman
to be present for duty in the new locale and there he resides. It is the element
of intent that may open the decree to attack, or even preclude access to the
courts of the state to which he is assigned.3 5 There is substantial authority
favoring the presumption that a serviceman remains continuously domiciled in the state claimed as his domicile at the time of induction notwithstanding subsequent military transfers.36 It is difficult to prove with reasonable certainty the existence of the necessary subjective intent to remain
permanently in a particular state. 37 The residence of military personnel
is said to be involuntary; they have no choice in the matter, while civilians
tend to change their places of abode by choice.3 8 A civilian's physical presence
in a new locality, which implies an exercise of volition, is strong evidence of
the requisite intent. Generally, the serviceman cannot rely upon presence
alone but must point to other evidence, such as the total immersion of himself in the activities of the community. 39 Servicemen who fail to show the
necessary intent, or for other reasons do not desire to effect a change in
their domicile, cannot resolve marital unhappiness in the state courts where
they are assigned and reside.
Although domicile remains the general rule for divorce jurisdiction, it
has been under attack by commentators as unsound and productive of
undesirable consequences, 40 particularly with regard to members of the
v. Zimmerman, 175 Ore. 585, 592, 155 P.2d 293, 296 (1945); 3 Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 1163,
1165 (1952).
33. Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 1163, 1165 (1952).
34. E.g., Seegers v. Strzempek, 149 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Mich. 1957); Humphrey v. Fort
Knox Transit Co., 58 F. Supp. 362 (W.D. Ky. 1945); Wise v. Bolster, 31 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.
Wash. 1940); Kinsel v. Pickens, 25 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Tex. 1938); Champ v. Champ, 229
Ark. 292, 314 S.W.2d 603 (1958); Thames, Domicile of Servicemen, 34 Miss. L.J. 160, 162
(1963).
35. E.g., Wheat v. Wheat, 229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958); Crownover v. Crownover,
58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127 (1954); Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 175 Ore. 585, 155 P.2d
293 (1945); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§15, 21 (1934); Note, The Servicemen's
Dilemma: Divorce Without Domicile, 13 Sw. L.J. 233, 236 (1959).
36. E.g., Lawrence v. Lawrence, 184 Misc. 515, 53 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Spires
v. Spires, 35 Ohio Op. 2d 289, 214 N.E.2d 691 (C.P. 1966); Wiesman v. Wiesman, 216 Tenn.

702, 393 S.W.2d 892 (1965);

RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§21 (1934); Thames, supra

note 34, at 161.
37. See generally note 33 supra.
38. Sweeny v. District of Columbia, 113 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 631
(1940); Thames, supra note 34, at 165.
39. Allen v. Allen, 52 N.M. 174, 177, 194 P.2d 270, 273 (1948); Thames, supra note 34,
at 166. See also RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §21 (1934).
40. E.g., Griswold, suna note 9; Leflar, Conflict of Laws and Family Law, 14 ARK. L.
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armed forces.41 Indeed, for the very reasons restricting divorce jurisdiction
solely to the state of technical domicile, inequity results to military personnel
not residing there. The place where the serviceman is stationed will most
likely possess a bona fide interest in his marriage superior to that ascribed
to the state of technical domicile.42 Moreover, the hardship and inconvenience
inherent in military service often preclude suit in the state of technical
domicile; time away from duty, distance to the domicile state, and the additional expense involved are some of the more salient obstacles.43
As early as 1807 the Massachusetts supreme court noted that the state of
true marital domicile "where all the evidence is to be collected, and where
the character of the parties is likely to be best known and most likely ascertained," possessed the primary interest in potential marital breakups. 44
Service families are important segments of the communities of the states
where they live, taking active part in the mainstream activities of that area
for a considerable period of time.4 5 Accordingly, events leading to divorce
are likely to occur there.6 There seems to be no reason why these states
should be less concerned with the adjustment of the marital difficulties of
servicemen than with those of civilians who have recently acquired domicile.
The ties existing between these states and servicemen are not illusory; when
matrimonial disharmony develops, these states and not those of technical
domicile will be directly affected.47 While the nature of the interest claimed
by the state of technical domicle is meritorious, the state in which the serviceman is stationed justifiably may claim that it is the de facto possessor of this
interest.
DEPARTURE FROM DOMICILE AS A JUISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITE

Concomitant with the Supreme Court's declaration in the two Williams
cases that domicile is the controlling aspect of divorce jurisdiction, 48 Justice
REv. 47

(1960); Lorenzen, ExtraterritorialDivorce- Williams v. North Carolina II, 54
YALE LJ. 799 (1945); Rogers & Rogers, The Disparity Between Due Process and Full Faith
and Credit: The Problem of the Somewhere Wife, 67 COLUM. L. Ri-v. 1363 (1967).

41. See generally note 35 supra; e.g., Lauterback v. Lauterback, 392 P.2d 24 (Alas.
1964); Mills v. Mills, 153 Fla. 746, 15 So. 2d 763 (1943); Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56
P.2d 464 (1936); Rush v. Rush, 171 Neb. 800, 108 N.W.2d 79 (1961); Wood v. Wood, 159
Tex. 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959).
42. E.g., Note, supra note 35, at 236; 40 MINN. L. REv. 77 (1955); 37 TEx. L. REV. 626
(1959). See also cases cited note 41 supra.
43. Id.

44. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 3 Mass. 157, 158 (1807).

45. In Alaska, for example, children of military personnel attend state schools, military
families take part in local social and community affairs, military personnel work closely
with the local populace in time of state disaster, and military personnel assist the state

fish and game department in conservation. These contacts were deemed more than sufficient
to give the state divorce jurisdiction over its military population, Lauterback v. Lauterback, 392 P.2d 24 (Alas. 1964). See also cases cited note 41 supra.
46. Id.
47. Crownover v. Crownover, 58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127, 142 (1954).
48. See cases cited note 24 supra.
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Rutledge dissenting in Williams II, contended that domicile is a variable
concept involving conflicting ideas of permanence and instantaneous change;
that the requisite intent is determined from conflicting inferences; that evidence allowed on collateral attack was unavailable in the divorce proceeding;
that the Federal Constitution makes no mention of the requirement; that the
purpose of the full faith and credit clause is to compel sister states to give
effect to conflicting decisions of other states; and finally that this decision
by the Supreme Court both approved Nevada's finding of domicile and
North Carolina's decision to the contrary.4 9 Indeed, the defect in the domicile
doctrine pronounced in the two Williams decisions is apparent. Ex parte
divorces while sanctioned by the Supreme Court cannot be relied upon by
the parties. Subsequent collateral attack may render the decree void outside
the divorcing state. The spouses face the possibility of bigamy and illegitimacy of subsequent children if they rely upon the decree. 50
Several recorded cases have placed jurisdiction for divorce on grounds
other than domicile. As early as 1818, the New York supreme court refused
to recognize a Vermont ex parte decree, reasoning that the plaintiff failed
to serve process on the defendant in the forum. 51 In subsequent decisions,
New York recognized foreign divorce decrees after receiving assurance either
that there was service of process on the defendant in the divorce state or that
the defendant entered an appearance in the proceeding.52 The New York
trend continued with a pre-Williams Mexican divorce case unequivocably
asserting physical presence as the basis for recognition. In that case the New
York supreme court stated that a duty existed to recognize the jurisdiction
of the Mexican court, established by the appearance of both parties litigant
53
before it.
A similar result was obtained in Minnesota when an out of state
decree was held to be immune from collateral attack on the ground that the
parties lacked domicile in the forum state. The record showed the plaintiff
had appeared in the proceedings. It was asserted that "whether the rule
[protecting the decree from collateral attack] is based on the theory of
jurisdiction conferred by consent, an appearance of the parties, as estoppel,
or some other theory, the result is desirable." 54
In Sherrer v. Sherrer55 the United States Supreme Court sanctioned a
similar departure from the domiciliary criterion. The parties, both Massachusetts domiciliaries obtained a Florida decree, the wife commencing the suit
56
in Florida after residing there for the ninety-day statutory predivorce period.
49. 325 U.S. at 244 (dissenting opinion). See also Reese, Does Domicile Bear a Single
Meaning?, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 589 (1955).
50. Stimson, Jurisdictionin Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness of the Domiciliary Theory,
42 A.B.A.J. 222, 223 (1956).
51. Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns, 121 (N.Y. 1818).
52. Glasser v. Glasser, 276 N.Y.2d 296, 12 N.E.2d 305, 292 N.Y.S. 165 (1938); Gould v.
Gould, 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490, 192 N.Y.S. 572 (1923). See also Howe, The Recognition
of Foreign Divorce Decrees in New York State, 40 COLUM. L. Rav. 373, 387 (1940).
53. Leviton v. Leviton, 254 App. Div. 2d 670, 6 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
54. Norris v. Norris, 200 Minn. 246, 247, 273 N.W. 708, 709 (1937).
55. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
56. FiA. STAT. §61.021 (1967) (effective Oct. 1, 1957) requires a six-month period of
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The husband represented by counsel answered the complaint. The Supreme
Court explained that the defendant had appeared in court; the parties therefore had had their day in court and the issue of jurisdiction was res judicata
in the husband's subsequent collateral attack on the decree. The previously
mentioned New York and Minnesota cases were cited in support of the conclusion. The husband's presence in the forum validated a divorce decree
without regard to the plaintiff wife's domiciliary status by prohibiting collateral attack on the decree. 57 Domicile then becomes of no importance when
the defendant appears in court and the decree is later collaterally attacked.
The interest of a state where the parties were physically present or have
entered an appearance is given preference over the competing interest of
the state of domicile.
The Supreme Court further emphasized its departure from domicile as
a jurisdictional prerequisite in Cook v. Cook. 58 The record showed that a
woman residing in Virginia with her second husband, while still married to
a first husband, traveled to Florida to obtain a divorce from her first husband.
Upon securing the Florida decree, she remarried her second husband. The
second husband later filed an annulment action in Vermont. The Vermont
court held that the wife was not a resident of Florida at the time the decree
for divorce from her husband was rendered and therefore both marriages
to the second husband were void. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the Vermont supreme court and held that the first husband was
presumed to have appeared in the divorce action since the record of the
proceeding was devoid of evidence to the contrary. The decree was res
judicata to the first husband; a fortiori it must be res judicata to a stranger
"unless Florida applied a less strict rule of res judicata to the second husband
than it does to the first."59 One commentator has noted that: 6o
Since husband number two was neither party nor privy to the divorce
decree, the question of domicile would not be res judicata as to him.
If he cannot attack the decree it is because there is nothing in it to
attack, that is, domicile is not the basis of jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction alone was enough.
SERIicEMEN's DivoRcE STATUTES

The power to grant divorces is statutory and is vested in the states.61
Legislation intended to remedy the migrant serviceman's problem has been
enacted by several states. 62 These statutes uniformly require a substantial
actual residency before filing a complaint for divorce.
57. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
58. 342 U.S. 126 (1951). See Overton, Sister State Divorces, 22 TENN. L. Rv.891, 907

(1953).
59. 342 U.S. at 128.

60. Stimson, supra note 50, at 224.
61. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Butler v. Butler, 222 A.2d 269 (Del. 1966);
Strater v. Strater, 159 Me. 508, 196 A.2d 94 (1963); Ross v. Ross, 208 So. 2d 194 (Miss.
1968); Timmerman v. Timmerman, 149 Neb. 46, 81 N.W.2d 135 (1965).
62. ALA. CODE fit. 7, §96 (l) (Supp. 1967); A1.AsKA STAT. §09.55.160 (1962); FLA. STAT.
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interest in the divorcing state, the period of residence required varying from
six months to twelve months, with the exception of Alabama, which deems
a serviceman domiciled in Alabama if stationed there, regardless of length
of time.63 The statutes are so written that it would be nearly impossible
for a serviceman to circumvent the divorce laws of his home state through
their use.

64

One of the earliest servicemen's divorce statutes was enacted in Kansas.
It permitted a serviceman assigned to a Kansas military installation for a
period of one year to bring an action for divorce.65 The validity of the statute
was sustained in 1936. The Kansas supreme court interpreted it as requiring
only one year's residence in Kansas, a requirement effectively removing the
necessity of domicile. 66 A Texas statute permits a serviceman to obtain a
divorce in a state court after residing in Texas for one year and for six
months within the county where the action is brought. 67 The statute
is also of the nondomiciliary class, requiring only a specified period of residency. In Wood v. Wood,68 an airman stationed in Texas for more than
one year brought an action for divorce under the statute's nondomiciliary
provision. The Texas supreme court examined the statute and declared it
constitutional. It was not deemed to violate the equal protection clause
although the effect of the statute was to allow nondomiciliary military
personnel the use of Texas courts for divorce purposes. New Mexico has a
similar statute, which was initially held to create a conclusive presumption
of domiciliary intent from proof establishing one year of continuous presence
pursuant to military requirements.69 In Crownover v. Crownover,70 the majority stated that the conclusive presumption was not arbitrary or capricious.
In a concurring opinion the chief justice indicated that constitutional due
71
process requirements could be met by something less than actual domicile.

§47.081 (1967); GA. CODE ANN. §30-107 (Supp. 1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-1502 (Supp. 1968);

Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §403.34 (Supp. 1968); NEB. REv. STAT. §42-303 (Supp. 1967); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §22-7-4 (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §1272 (Supp. 1968); TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4631

(Supp. 1968); VA. CoDE ANN. §20-97 (Supp. 1968).

63. Id. The Alabama statute has no residency requirement as a condition precedent
to a serviceman's action for divorce in Alabama. Florida's statute has no residency requirement, however an action cannot be brought until the six-month predivorce residency
requirement of §61.021 is fulfilled. Oklahoma's statute expressly requires a six-month period
as a condition precedent to a serviceman's action for divorce in Oklahoma. The remaining
eight servicemen's statutes uniformly require a one-year residency requirement as condition
precedent to a serviceman's action for divorce.
64. Note, supra note 35, at 249.
65. KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-1502 (Supp. 1967) states in part: "Provided, That any person
who has been a resident of any United States army post or military reservation within the
state of Kansas for one year next preceding the filing of the petition may bring an action
for divorce in any county adjacent to said United States army post or military reservation."
66. Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464 (1936).
67.

Tax. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 4631 (Supp. 1968).

68.
69.
70.
71.

159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-7-4 (Supp. 1967).
58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127 (1954).
Id. at 141 (concurring opinion).
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A subsequent decision, Wallace v. Wallace,72 recognized that the Crownover
opinion was really an express rejection of domicile, and held the New Mexico
statute to be a satisfactory nondomiciliary jurisdictional provision requiring
one year's residency as opposed to presuming domicile. The Supreme Court
of Florida in Mills v. Mills 7 3 sustained a statute providing that a serviceman
stationed in the state was prima facie a resident for the purpose of maintaining any suit. The statute creates a rebuttable presumption of domicile.7 4 A
serviceman, therefore, who complies with Florida's six month predivorce
period of actual residency may successfully gain access to Florida's courts
for the purposes of divorce. 75 Alabama has a statute similar to that of Florida
but goes one step further, permitting a serviceman to maintain any action in
an Alabama court without regard to length of time spent in Alabama.7 8
The Alabama supreme court upheld the validity of the statute and interpreted
the act to deem servicemen assigned in the state instant domiciliaries of
Alabama. The court admonished that domicile was essential to divorce
jurisdiction and the legislature was not authorized to alter it. Furthermore,
the involuntary nature of military assignment would negate the creation of
77
the "quickie" divorce problem.
These statutes have been criticized on the grounds that other states are
not required to give full faith and credit to them. The decrees are not
secure from collateral attack in a state accepting nothing less than evidence
of plaintiff's bona fide domicile in the divorcing forum. It is conceivable,
therefore, that more inconvenience and hardship may result immediately
than will be ultimately alleviated by a shift away from the domicile jurisdic78
tional requirement.
While the Supreme Court has yet to pass on the validity of the servicemen's statutes, it has struck down a Virgin Islands' statutes creating a
presumption of domicile after the plaintiff had resided continuously for six
weeks within the territory.79 In Alton v. Alton,80 a Connecticut housewife
traveled to the Virgin Islands, remained there six weeks, and then proceeded
to file an action for divorce. Her husband, also domiciled in Connecticut,
appeared in the action. The trial court felt that domicile was required as
a jurisdictional prerequisite for divorce in the Virgin Islands. The plaintiff
was determined not to be domiciled in the forum and therefore the court
was without jurisdiction. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals voiced a
72. 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958).
73. 153 Fla. 746, 15 So. 2d 763 (1943).
74. FA. STAT. §47.081 (1967) states: "Any person in any branch of service of the
United States, including military and naval service, and the husband or the wife of any
such person, if he or she is living within the borders of the state, shall be prima fade a
resident of the state for the purpose of maintaining any action."
75.

FLA. STAT.

§61.02 (1967).

76. ALA. CODE tit. 7, §96 (1) (Supp. 1967).
77. Conrad v. Conrad, 275 Ala. 202, 153 So. 2d 635 (1963).
78. See, eg., RESTATEmENT OF CONFLICt or LAws §111 (1934); Lewis, note 10 supra;
40 MINN. L. REv. 77, 79 (1955); 37 TEx. L. REv. 626, 628 (1959).
79. No. 55 [1953] V.1. Laws §9a (declared unconstitutional 1955).
80. 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
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similar view in a 4-3 opinion striking down the statute as contrary to constitutional due process. The presumption that one who remained physically
present within the territory for six weeks was a domiciliary of the Virgin
Islands was considered irrational. A vigorous dissent maintained that the
statute was not contrary to the requirements of due process, and that there
was a rational connection between domicile and physical presence. Since
physical presence was an element of domicile, six weeks residence could be
regarded to be of sufficient probative value with other considerations to
establish the requisite domiciliary intent and to sustain the constitutionality
of the presumption as not arbitrary or capricious.81 The dissent disparaged
the argument that the domicile prerequisite was known to the founding
fathers at the time the Constitution was ratified, and indicated the concept
was adopted later. Furthermore, the dissent maintained that the statutory
stipulation of physical presence was valid, noting its application in a number
of British Commonwealth countries. The case was appealed to the United
82
States Supreme Court but was settled prior to hearing.
The validity of the statute, however, was considered by the Supreme Court
in Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith.83 In a 5-3 decision declaring the
statute unconstitutional, the Court did not mention domicile but held the
Virgin Islands to be powerless to enact the legislation without congressional
fiat. 84 The dissenting opinion pointed out that the majority had merely
masked its decision, basing it on the domicile concept without using the word.
Moreover, the Virgin Islands had been authorized by Congress to create
legislation of a local nature that affects persons physically within the territory.
The provisions of the statute were applicable only to those physically present
85
within the Islands and as such the statute should have been declared valid.
The Supreme Court's disapprobation of the Virgin Islands' statute does
not signal an eventual demise of remedial servicemen's statutes. The Virgin
Island's statutes encouraged forum-shopping couples to circumvent intentionally the divorce laws of their home through the use of its "quickie" residence
requirement. Servicemen statutes are intended solely to afford military
personnel the same opportunity to obtain a divorce as that possessed by
state domiciliaries. Indeed, the length of the residency requirement of the
servicemen statutes militates against any possibility that armed forces personnel may obtain divorces more easily or flaunt the morals of the local
community. Notwithstanding, very few people are likely to join the military
services in order to get a divorce. 86

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

207 F.2d at 678.
Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
349 U.S. 1 (1955).
Id.
Id. at 16 (dissenting opinion).
Note, supra note 35, at 237.
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Since domicile was nearly institutionalized in the two Williams decisions,
7
the law of divorce jurisdiction has been experiencing extensive change.
An impressive body of precedent now exists supporting a relaxation of the
rigid requirement of technical domicile. Servicemen are permitted to obtain
divorce decrees if they have been present within the state of duty for a
specific period of time. s8 Several state supreme courts have upheld servicemen
statutes in opinions offering sound arguments supporting their validity.8 9
Indeed, even the United States Supreme Court has indicated a relaxation of
the domicile requirement in the cases of Sherrer v. Sherrer99 and Cook v.
Cook91 . On the basis of this precedent it has been suggested that the Supreme
Court would be receptive to servicemen statutes calling for a relaxation of
the technical domicile requirement.9 2 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
never stated that domicile is essential to full faith and credit when decrees
are rendered in states not requiring domicile.93 Williams II defined domicile
in terms of a nexus between person and place so as to control the creation
of significant legal relationships.9 4 Examination of this definition, rather than
its blind application, reveals an endorsement of the validity of servicemen
statutes. These enactments have grounded divorce jurisdiction for servicemen on the strength of the contacts the litigant has with the forum state, a
basis equivalent to the person-state nexus of Williams 11.95
Moreover, it is suggested that the laws of a territory apply to those
people present within the state boundaries and only while they are present.
If marriage is created under the territorial law of the marrying state and not
under the laws of the state of domicile, may not the marriage also be dis96
solved in states other than the state of domicile?
While the Supreme Court might act to insure extraterritorial recognition
of servicemen's divorces under the full faith and credit clause, it has noticeably abstained from doing so. It does not seem extravagant to say that the
Court has refrained from taking action in view of the capabilitiy of Congress
to describe more efficiently and effectively a divorce jurisdiction requirement
97
and to declare that it shall be granted recognition throughout the Union.
Congress under the full faith and credit clause "may by general laws
87. See generally notes 40, 41, 62 supra.
88. Id.

89. See generally notes 62-77 supra.
90. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
91. 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
92. Note, supra note 35, at 255.
93. Cf. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S.
14 (1903); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
94. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
95. Id.
96. Stimson, supra note 50, at 294.
97. Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 371, 388 (1933).
See also Franklin, The Dilemma of Migratory Divorces: A PartialSolution Through Federal
Legislation, 1 On-- L. Rav. 151 (1948); Mayers, Ex Parte Divorce: A Proposed Federal
Remedy, 54 COLum. L. Rav. 54 (1954).
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prescribe the manner in which [judicial] . . . proceedings shall be proved

and the effect thereof." 981 By act of Congress, May 26, 1790, a state's judgments were required to be recognized in sister states in a manner analogous
to that given them in the state from which they were taken. 99 In 1940,
Congress enacted the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. 100 While containing no express provision designed to render the serviceman a specific
remedy in this area of divorce, the act is to be construed liberally to effectuate the purpose of relieving those engaged in military service from mental
distress and diminished efficiency resulting from an inability to function with
the freedom of action possessed by a civilian. Under the statute, the trial
court is afforded wide discretion to determine in each case whether a serviceman seeking a remedy has had his ability to prosecute or defend an action
adversely affected by reason of his military service. This congressional enactment reflects a nation's sense of obligation to lessen the burdens of military
service.101 It is proposed that article VI, Administrative Remedies of the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, be amended to provide:
Persons serving in military service who have been continuously stationed
at a military installation in one of the several states for a period of one
year shall be deemed domiciled in that state for the purposes of bringing
an action for divorce in that state.
The proposed amendment grants to those servicemen residing within a state
pursuant to military orders for a period of at least one year, an opportunity
equivalent to that of the state's civilian domiciliaries to gain judicial relief
for marital discord. It incorporates a one-year residency requirement, a
period deemed minimally acceptable by the majority of the state servicemen
statutes for creation of the person-state nexus required for the exercise of
divorce jurisdiction.102 More importantly, the proposal precludes collateral
attack for lack of jurisdiction. The serviceman is conclusively presumed to
be domiciled in the state for the purposes of divorce jurisdiction.
The problems involving jurisdiction to grant divorce decrees arising over
servicemen removed from their states of technical domicile would be effectively ameliorated by the proposed amendment. The dilemma facing servicemen burdened with unhappy marriages would be resolved in a manner giving
the state of the true marital res jurisdiction over that relationship. Divorce
jurisdiction would be located in the state having a realistic interest in the
efficient and effective administration of the serviceman's matrimonial affairs.
WILLIAM

98.

U. S. CONST. art. IV,

99.

Act of May 26, 1790, 28 U.S.C. 687 (1968).

A.

EVANS

§.

100. 50 U.S.C. § §501-90 (1940).
101. Id.; Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 390 (1957).
102. See, e.g., discussion note 63 supra.
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